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Robust Energy Harvesting Based on a Stackelberg Game
Siddhartha Sarma, Kundan Kandhway and Joy Kuri
Abstract—We study a Stackelberg game between a base station
and a multi-antenna power beacon for wireless energy harvesting
in a multiple sensor node scenario. Assuming imperfect CSI
between the sensor nodes and the power beacon, we propose a
utility function that is based on throughput non-outage probability
at the base station. We provide an analytical solution for the
equilibrium in case of a single sensor node. For the general case
consisting of multiple sensor nodes, we provide upper and lower
bounds on the power and price (players’ strategies). We compare
the bounds with solutions resulting from an exhaustive search and
a relaxed semidefinite program, and find the upper bound to be
tight.
Index Terms—Wireless energy harvesting, Stackelberg game,
Imperfect CSI, Beamforming, Sensor networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, due to the ubiquitous presence of wireless devices,
wireless power transfer (WPT) [1], [2] has grabbed the atten-
tion of researchers. WPT has huge application in scenarios
such as sensor networks in a border area or a toxic zone,
where regular replacement of batteries is almost impossible.
Traditionally, wireless sensor nodes rely on batteries with
limited lifetime to transmit data to a base station. In a wireless
power harvesting scenario, along with the base station, power
beacons are also deployed to recharge the sensor nodes. In
the absence of any internal power source, these sensor nodes
follow a harvest-then-transmit [3] scheme to communicate
with the base station.
In practice, sensor networks and power beacons may be
deployed by different authorities. As a result, one needs a mu-
tually beneficial scheme that ensures energy trading between
both parties. Such scenarios involving multiple self-interested
agents can be studied in a game theoretic framework. The
authors in [4] have studied energy trading between power
beacons and their users by formulating a Stackelberg game.
Our modeling approach and analysis are different from those
in [4]. Unlike [4], where single antenna power beacons are
considered, we consider a multi-antenna power beacon [5]–
[7]. Such multi-antenna systems can improve the efficiency of
energy transfer by employing beamforming. Contrarily, a base
station with a single antenna can cater to the requirements of
low data rate sensor networks and is considered in our work.
In [4], perfect channel state information (CSI) between
the power beacons and the sensor node is assumed. But, in
real-world scenarios, one requires training signals to estimate
channel gains and a higher accuracy can only be obtained
at the cost of a higher estimation time. For multi-antenna
systems, the issue is more critical compared to single an-
tenna as efficient beamforming requires accurate CSI. Also,
unlike capacity, a logarithmic (sub-linear) function of channel
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Fig. 1: Graphical representation of energy harvesting sensor network.
gain, harvested energy is a quadratic (super-linear) function
of channel gain and, therefore, inaccurate CSI has further
degrading effects. Therefore, considering imperfect CSI (e.g.,
based only on path-loss) for the power beacon—which has
multiple antennas—is more realistic, and this is considered
in our work. Also, we generalize the model by considering
multiple sensor nodes.
Due to imperfect CSI [6], our problem formulation differs
from that in [4] significantly. In [4], utilities are deterministic,
whereas, in our formulation the base station’s utility is based
on a probabilistic term in the proposed Stackelberg game.
As we cannot directly calculate the data throughput, we
consider a utility function that is based on throughput non-
outage probability—probability of throughput being above a
predefined threshold. Outage probability of an adhoc network
with wireless power transfer was evaluated in [8] in a non-
game theoretic setting and significantly differs from ours. Also,
we differ from [3], [6] as in those works, the sensor network
and power beacon belonged to the same deploying authority.
Our work ensures quality of sensing by keeping the data
throughput for each sensor node above a certain threshold.
Outage occurs when the throughput goes below that threshold.
Therefore, we would like to improve the minimum non-outage
probability over the sensor nodes (equivalent to decreasing
the maximum outage probability) by asking the power beacon
to adjust the antenna gains appropriately while transmitting
sufficient power. The base station should compensate the
power beacon monetarily for its service. So, the utility of
the base station should include the revenue generated due
to non-outage of data throughput and compensation paid to
the power beacon (with appropriate scaling). The utility of
the power beacon should consist of the revenue generated by
selling power, minus the operational cost.
Due to intractability of the throughput non-outage probabil-
ity, we bound it using Markov’s and Jensen’s inequalities. We
then formulate a Stackelberg game with these utility functions
whose equilibrium simultaneously maximizes the respective
utilities. The solution of this Stackelberg game decides the
optimal antenna weights and transmit power for the power
beacon for single sensor node scenario. For the multiple sensor
scenario, we provide computationally efficient solutions by
bounding the base station’s utility function.
The main contributions with respect to prior works (includ-
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ing [4]) are: (i) Formulation of a Stackelberg game for multiple
sensor nodes with a multiple antenna power beacon assuming
imperfect CSI between the sensor nodes and the power beacon,
(ii) Analytical evaluation of the optimal solution for the Stack-
elberg game for a single sensor node, (iii) The equilibrium
strategies (power and price) of the players corresponding to
the upper and lower bounds on the base station’s utility for
the most general case involving multiple sensor nodes, (iv)
Comparison among the solutions provided by the bounds, a
relaxed semidefinite program and exhaustive search.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & PROBLEM FORMULATION
The system model consists of one base station (BS), one
multi-antenna power beacon (PB) and N sensor nodes (SN),
indexed by i ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N} as shown in Fig. 1.
The power beacon has M antennas, whereas, the base station
and sensors are equipped with a single antenna each. All
sensor nodes can communicate directly with the base station.
We adopt the harvest-then-transmit model [3]. We consider
a slotted system in which each time slot is divided into two
parts: (i) In the first part, which consists of a fraction τ of the
total time slot, the power beacon transmits power to the sensor
nodes for energy harvesting; (ii) In the second part (of duration
(1−τ) fraction of the time slot), the sensor nodes transmit data
(information) to the base station using the harvested energy. In
several scenarios, different authorities may deploy the sensor
network and the power beacons; so, the base station needs to
negotiate with the power beacon for wireless power transfer.
In the proposed Stackelberg game, the power beacon acts as a
seller and charges the base station at the rate ρ per unit power
and as a consequence, the base station asks for P units of
power from the power beacon.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that each time
slot is of unit length. During the first part, energy harvested
at the ith sensor node is given by:
Ei = τ |h
†
iw|
2P, where w†w = 1 (1)
where hi is the M × 1 complex channel gain vector from the
power beacon to the ith sensor node, and w is the complex
antenna gain vector of the same dimension. The second part
of the time slot is divided into N equal parts.1 Each sensor
node transmits data to the base station in its assigned time slot
by completely spending the energy harvested during the first
part. The data throughput at the base station due to the ith
sensor node can be written as:
Di(P,w) =
(1− τ)
N
[
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsi|
2 Ei
σ2((1 − τ)/N)
)]
.
Using (1), we get
Di(P,w) =
(1− τ)
2N
log2
(
1 +
τN |hsi|2|h
†
iw|
2P
σ2(1− τ)
)
. (2)
Here, hsi is the complex channel gain between the ith sensor
and the base station. In the throughput equation, we have
1One can adjust τ and transmission times assigned to the N sensor nodes
based on requirements. Many TDMA systems [9] use predefined time slots
for operational simplicity. We have assumed equal time slots as an example.
assumed that the Gaussian noise is characterized by zero mean
and variance σ2. We assume that the base station has perfect
information about all hsi (can be obtained using training
signals), whereas, the base station has imperfect information
about all hi (as mentioned before). Due to imperfect CSI,
throughput cannot be calculated; therefore, the base station
would like to maximize throughput non-outage probability
given by:
Pnon−outage,i(β) = Pr (Di(P,w) > β) . (3)
Here, β > 0 is a predefined threshold. To ensure quality
of sensing, the base station would try to improve the mini-
mum Pnon−outage,i(β) over the sensor nodes by purchasing
appropriate amount of power and by asking the power beacon
to adjust the antenna gains. However, at the same time,
expenditure on power should be reduced, leading to a weighted
metric.
We model the imperfect CSI between the power beacon and
the ith sensor node in the following manner: hi = ĥi + ei,
where ĥi is the estimated channel and the error ei is a random
vector, which is distributed according to circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution, i.e., CN (0,Σ), where Σ is the
covariance matrix. Consequently, from (2), Pnon−outage,i(β)
is a logarithmic function of a nonlinear combination of multi-
ple Gaussian random variables. A closed form expression for
Pnon−outage,i(β) is difficult to obtain, therefore we propose
the following bound on Pnon−outage,i(β) by applying the
Markov’s and Jensen’s inequalities.
Pr
(
Di(P,w) ≥ β
)
≤
E[Di(P,w)]
β
≤
(1− τ )
2βN
log
2

1 + τ |hsi|2E
[
|h†
i
w|2
]
P
(1− τ )σ2/N


=
(1− τ )
2βN
log
2

1 + τ |hsi|2Nw†E
[
hih
†
i
]
wP
(1− τ )σ2

 (4)
Denoting the right hand side of (4) by Γi(P,w), the utility
of the base station is:
UBS(ρ, P,w) = min
i
{αΓi(P,w)} − τρP,
where α(> 0) is a weighting parameter. The utility maximiza-
tion problem for the base station is:
max UBS(ρ, P,w), subject to: P ≥ 0, w†w = 1 (5)
We define the following utility function for the power bea-
con: UPB(ρ, P ) = (ρ− c)P , where c captures the operational
cost per unit transmitted power. Note that if ρ < c, then
the utility is negative and power beacon would refuse to sell
power. The relevant optimization problem at the power beacon
is:
max UPB(ρ, P ) subject to: ρ ≥ c. (6)
We solve the problems (5) and (6) to obtain the optimal
antenna weight w∗, optimal price ρ∗ and optimal power P ∗
that simultaneously maximize the utilities of both the players.
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III. ANALYSIS & SOLUTION
In Sec III-A, we consider a scenario containing a single
sensor node and obtain a closed form solution for the proposed
Stackelberg game. In Sec III-B, we address the multiple sensor
node scenario.
A. Single sensor node (N=1)
For the single sensor node scenario, Γ = (1 −
τ) ln (1 + µκP ) /(2β ln 2), where κ = τ |hs|2/(σ2(1 − τ)),
µ = w†Qw andQ = E
[
hh†
]
= ĥĥ†+Σ. The utility function
of the base station for this scenario can be rewritten as:
UBS(ρ, P ) = α
′ ln (1 + µκP )− τρP, (7)
where, α′ = α(1 − τ)/(2β ln 2).
Since, we are considering normalized antenna weights and
the optimal antenna weight is independent of P , therefore
w†Qw can be maximized in isolation using the following
optimization problem:
µ∗ = max
w
w†Qw subject to: w†w = 1 (8)
Optimization problem (8) is the Rayleigh Quotient problem
[10, p. 176] and, therefore, the optimal objective function
value, µ∗ and the solution, w∗ are the maximum eigenvalue of
the matrix Q and the corresponding eigenvector, respectively.
First, we optimize the base station’s utility for a fixed ρ.
Differentiating the base station’s utility function with respect
to P , we get:
∂UBS
∂P
=α′
µ∗κ
(1 + µ∗κP )
− τρ = 0
=⇒ P ∗(ρ) =
1
µ∗κ
(
α′µ∗κ
τρ
− 1
)
(9)
Second, we replace the value of P (from (9)) in the seller’s
utility function (6) and maximize with respect to ρ.
dUPB
dρ
= P + (ρ− c)
dP
dρ
= 0
=⇒
1
µ∗κ
(
α′µ∗κ
τρ
− 1
)
− (ρ− c)
α′
τρ2
= 0
=⇒ ρ∗ =
√
α′cµ∗κ/τ (10)
Substituting (10) in (9), we calculate the optimal power,
P ∗ =
1
µ∗κ
(√
α′µ∗κ
τc
− 1
)
(11)
Note that as both UBS and UPB are concave functions, so
P ∗ and ρ∗ are equilibrium points of the proposed Stackelberg
game.
Special case (M=1): For this single antenna power beacon
and single sensor node case, we have an alternate approach
for calculating the equilibrium. Note that we only need to find
the optimal power value (beamforming is absent). Rearranging
the terms in the probability expression in Eq. (3):
Pnon−outage(β) = Pr
(
|h|2≥
(4
β
(1−τ) − 1)(1− τ)σ2
τ |hs|2P
)
(12)
h = ĥ + e, where the error e is distributed according to
CN (0, σ21). Thus, |h|2 is a non-central chi-square random
variable with degree of freedom (d.o.f.) 2 and non-centrality
parameter θ2 = 2
(
ℜ(ĥ)
σ1
)2
+ 2
(
ℑ(ĥ)
σ1
)2
= 2|ĥ|
2
σ21
. Further,
we can approximate the non-central chi square distribution
of d.o.f. 2 by a central chi-square random variable (χ20) of the
same d.o.f. [11]. Recalling that the chi square random variable
with d.o.f 2 is an exponential random variable, from Eq. (12),
we can write
Pnon−outage(β)≈Pr
(
χ20 ≥
η
P
)
=exp
(
−
η
P
)
,
where, η = (4
β
(1−τ) −1)(1−τ)σ2
τ |hs|2(1+θ2/2)
.
The approximation considered above is quite accurate for
smaller values of centrality parameter (θ2 < 0.4). Now, the
utility can be written as:
UBS(P ) = α
′ exp(−η/P )− τρP (13)
Proposition 1: The optimal solution can be calculated by
solving the following system of equations in P and ρ:
α′ηe−(η/P ) − τρP 2 = 0 and η/P − c/ρ = 1. (14)
Proof: Differentiating Eq. (13) with respect to P and
equating it to 0, we get:
dUBS
dP
=
α′η exp(−η/P )
P 2
− τρ = 0 (15)
Similarly, for utility of the power beacon, we get:
dUPB
dρ
= P + (ρ− c)
dP
dρ
= 0 (16)
For a given ρ, Eq. (15) provides us the optimal utility.
Differentiating it with respect ρ, we get (using Eq. (15)):(
α′η2 exp(−η/P )
P 2
− 2τρP
)
dP
dρ
= τP 2 ⇒ ρ
( η
2P
− 1
) dP
dρ
=
P
2
Replacing this in Eq. (16), we get the second equation,
whereas, the first equation corresponds to Eq. (15).
B. Multiple sensor nodes
For multiple sensor nodes, the base station utility is:
UBS(ρ, P,w) = min
i
α(1 − τ)
2Nβ
log2
(
1 +
Nτ |hsi|2w†QiwP
(1 − τ)σ2
)
− τρP.
(17)
Here Qi = E[hih†i ] and hsi is the ith sensor-to-base station
channel gain.
As in the previous section, we can optimize antenna gain
separately to maximize utility. We formulate the following
optimization problem to obtain the optimal w.
max ν (18a)
subject to: |hsi|2w†Qiw ≥ ν, ∀i ∈ N , w†w = 1, (18b)
Problem (18) is non-convex, so a global solution is difficult
to obtain. But we can obtain analytical upper and lower bounds
efficiently. Let
νmin=min{λmin(|hsi|
2Qi), ∀i}, (19a)
νmax=min{λmax(|hsi|
2Qi), ∀i} (19b)
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Here, λmin(.) and λmax(.) denote the minimum and max-
imum eigenvalue of a matrix. Using the value of νmin or
νmax (instead of µ∗/|hs|2) in (10) and (11), we can solve
the Stackelberg game for these two values.
Alternatively, using w†Qiw = Tr(w†Qiw) =
Tr(Qiww
†) = Tr(QiW), and relaxing the rank-1 constraint
W = ww†, Problem (18) results in the following relaxed
semidefinite program:
max ν (20a)
s.t. : Tr(|hsi|2QiW) ≥ ν,∀i ∈ N , T r(W) = 1, W  0 (20b)
Here, Tr() indicates the trace of the matrix. By solving the
semidefinite problem (20), we will obtain the optimal W∗
and νsdp (optimal ν value). The corresponding optimal vector
wsdp can be obtained by using eigenvalue decomposition of
W∗ or applying randomization technique [12].
Calculate w∗, µ∗
(νmin, νmax, νsdp,
νgs) at the base station
Calculate P ∗ at the base station
Calculate the ρ∗ at the power beacon
Fig. 2: Block diagram of Stackelberg game equilibrium evaluation.
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Fig. 3: Plot of optimal power and price with respect to distance
(d) between single antenna power beacon and a single sensor
node for the utility function (7) and (13) for M = 1, α =
103, β = 1, c = 1, θ2 = 0.1 and σ2 = 10−8. This plot
compares the optimal solutions calculated using two different
approaches: (a) solutions to Eq. (10) and (11) when M = 1,
(b) solutions to the system of equations (14).
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Fig. 4: Plot of optimal power and price with respect to distance (d)
between power beacon and a single sensor node. α = 103, β =
1, c = 1, M = 5 and σ = 10−8.
Fig. 2 summarizes the steps involved in evaluating the
equilibrium for the proposed Stackelberg game.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we have evaluated the Stackelberg equilib-
rium for different scenarios: (i) Single antenna power beacon,
single sensor node (Fig. 3), (ii) Multiple antenna power
beacon, single sensor node (Fig. 4, 5), (iii) Multiple antenna
power beacon and multiple sensor nodes (Fig. 6a, 6b).
In Fig. 4, we have plotted the optimal power and corre-
sponding price with respect to distance d between the power
beacon and the sensor node calculated using two approaches—
(a) Eq. (10), (11) and (b) Proposition 1 (Eq. (14)).
In Fig. 4, we have plotted the optimal power and corre-
sponding price with respect to distance d between the power
beacon and the sensor node calculated using (10) and (11).
Channel gain values are calculated based on the distance be-
tween the nodes using the following expression h(.) = d
−γ/2
(.) ,
with a path-loss factor γ = 3.5. The ambient noise variance
σ2 = 10−8. We have set the proportion of time for which
energy is harvested τ = 1/2, throughput threshold β = 1,
weighting parameter α = 103 and power beacon’s operational
cost parameter c = 1. The error covariance matrix Σ is
considered to be I/dγ , where I is the identity matrix.
Fig. 5 studies the asymmetry in power allocation in antennas
due to asymmetry in channel uncertainties for a single sensor
node scenario (Sec. III-A). Without loss of generality, let ζ be
the element at position (1, 1) of the diagonal covariance matrix
Σ, with other diagonal entries unchanged. We have plotted
the power allocated to the M antennas with respect to this
uncertainty coefficient ζ. We have evaluated the corresponding
eigenvector w∗, and calculated the power used by those
antennas. It is evident that to mitigate the uncertainty, the
power beacon will allocate more power to the first antenna, the
channel corresponding to which has higher uncertainty (Fig.
5).
In Fig. 6a and 6b—corresponding to the multiple sen-
sor node scenario (Sec III-B)—we have plotted the power
transmitted and the price charged by the power beacon with
respect to the distance d for different M (number of an-
tennas of the power beacon) values. The parameter d is
the distance between the center of the area where sensors
are randomly placed, and the power beacon. Various curves
correspond to νmin, νmax (calculated from (19)), the optimal
ν calculated from SDP (Problem (20)), and ν obtained from
global (exhaustive) search. The number of sensor nodes is
N = 20. The base station coordinate is fixed at (−10, 0)
and the power beacon coordinate varies as (d, 0). Sensor
nodes are randomly placed in a rectangular area with corners
(−4,−10), (4,−10), (4, 10) and (−4, 10). The results are
averaged over 100 random positions of the sensors in this
rectangular region.
We find the upper bound in (19b) to be tight, i.e., using
the νmax in (17), we get a problem whose optimal solution
(P , ρ) is almost exactly the same as the optimal obtained
by global search. Also, for each d, the difference between
the power (price) values calculated from the upper bound
and exhaustive search is smaller than the difference between
the power (price) values calculated from the SDP (20) and
exhaustive search. Note that, as the number of antennas M
increases, the power transmitted by the beacon decreases.
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Fig. 5: Power allocated vs. error coefficient
(ζ) for a single sensor node. M = 5 and
d = 10.
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Fig. 6: Power and price vs. d for M = 5, 10. Plots corresponds to ν from (19a), (19b),
Problem (20) and Global (exhaustive) search, respectively. N = 20. Note: ν from global
search and νmax lead to almost same results.
Also, as expected, transmit power increases with distance. As
ĥiĥ
†
i is a rank-one matrix and Σ is a scaled identity matrix,
the smallest eigenvalue of matrix
(
ĥiĥ
†
i +Σ
)
is independent
of ĥi and depends only on the eigenvalues of Σ, which is
same for all i. Hence, from (19a) the power and price values
corresponding to νmin are overlapping.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have considered a Stackelberg game be-
tween the base station and the multi-antenna power beacon for
wireless energy harvesting in a multiple sensor node network.
We consider imperfect CSI between the power beacon and
sensor nodes. The base station’s utility is based on throughput
non-outage probability and expenditure due to purchase of
power. For the single sensor node scenario, we evaluate the
equilibrium analytically. Equilibrium strategies corresponding
to the upper and lower bounds on the utility of the base station
is evaluated for multiple sensor nodes.
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